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7 Judicial deference or political loyalty?
The Hungarian Constitutional Court’s role in
tackling crisis situations
Zoltán Szente and Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz
Introduction
Our basic presumption for this research is that some events and developments of
recent years, such as the world ﬁnancial crisis, terrorism or mass migration, may
have affected the national legal systems in Europe, including the constitutional
jurisprudence of the various countries. In the case of Hungary, we can say that
both assumptions have been realised; that is, some general European tendencies
have had deep impacts on Hungary’s legal system and the constitutional practice
of its Constitutional Court has also changed signiﬁcantly. Hence, this country seems
ideal to be studied for our purposes. The question is whether these challenges really
have triggered the most important changes of constitutional jurisprudence, and
what have been the internal dynamics of the very recent developments in the
interpretive practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.
1. The system of constitutional adjudication in Hungary
The institution of the constitutional court does not have a long tradition in Hungary.
In fact, a centralised Constitutional Court was one of the new institutions estab-
lished during the country’s transition to democracy, when it was founded by the
constitutional amendment in 1989. The Court more or less was founded on the
pattern of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht,1 establishing a ‘European’ or
‘Kelsenian’ model of constitutional review. In the period of the ‘system change’,
when the Communist rule came to end in Hungary, and the country became a
Western-like constitutional democracy through peaceful political negotiations
between the representatives of the old political leadership and the new opposition
movements, the distrust between the negotiating parties led to the establishment
of an independent Constitutional Court with wide-ranging responsibilities.
The Court was provided with an exclusionary power to examine the con-
stitutionality of legal acts through abstract judicial review. Because everybody
could submit any statutory act to the court for review (actio popularis), virtually,
sooner or later, all important laws landed before the body. In certain areas, ex ante
examination of the constitutionality of legal acts (e.g. international treaties or
parliamentary standing orders) fell also within the competence of the Court, which
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was also empowered to investigate conﬂicts between international treaties and the
national law. The Court decided on individual constitutional complaints too, but
in fact it was more an indirect judicial review of the statutes on which the indivi-
dual judicial decisions were based. Another responsibility was (and is also today) to
decide on the conﬂicts of competence between state organs. The function by
which the Court could interpret the provisions of the Constitution without any
individual legal dispute granted the Constitutional Court a primary political role
because, in this respect, the Court appeared to be the ﬁnal arbiter of discussions
that usually have direct political implications.
The Court was established as a quasi-judicial organ; though it bore some char-
acteristics of judicial tribunals (such as the structural independence or the irremo-
vable status of the judges), other classical judicial principles and guarantees were
missing in its procedure (there is no adversarial procedure, for example).2 The
body consisted of 11 members, who were elected by a two-thirds majority of MPs
for nine years, and could be re-elected once. The original objective of the condition
of qualiﬁed majority was to enforce a consensus between the government and the
opposition parties of the day, thus eliminating in this way the partisan membership
within the Court. This expectation, however, was only moderately realised;
although the majority requirement was coupled with strict incompatibility rules,
the objective of which was to keep party politics separate from the Court, the way
its members were selected (i.e. parliamentary nomination and election) brought
the body close to the party politics.
From 1990 onwards, the Constitutional Court established a rich and extensive
jurisprudence; virtually, it has dealt with almost all classical issues as is usual in
those Western countries that have much longer constitutional traditions. Undoubt-
edly, the Court reached a pre-eminent position in the Hungarian constitutional
system, and it had great success in elaborating and standardising the living con-
stitutional law. It is a commonly shared view among scholars that the Court, in
the ﬁrst nine years of its operation (the period is generally called Sólyom Court
after its ﬁrst president) followed a strongly ‘activist’ practice3 relating both to its
jurisdiction and to interpretive practice.4 This activism based on a dispute resolution
approach of constitutional review required the Court to decide all constitutional
controversies that were submitted to it, rather than to escape from the responsi-
bility of the ultimate decision. Accordingly, the Court not only decided on the
most essential constitutional controversies, but, because every attempt to make a
new Constitution between 1990 and 2011 proved to be unsuccessful, in a sense
the Court undertook a quasi-constitution-making role. Although the body was
frequently criticised for its jurisdictional and interpretive activism, this approach
seemed to be widely accepted, partly due to the antagonistic relations between the
rightist and leftist parties, which excluded any consensus on constitutional issues.
In the general elections of 2010 the former rightist opposition party, the Fidesz,
and its satellite Christian Democratic Party won a landslide victory, and owing to
the disproportionate election system, the new government acquired a two-thirds
majority. In the spring of 2011, the Parliament, in the absence of the two demo-
cratic opposition parties (which, protesting against the ‘destruction of the rule of
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law’, boycotted the whole constitution-making process), approved a new Funda-
mental Law of Hungary.
The new Constitution, effective from 1 January 2012, has introduced some
explicit principles and methods of constitutional interpretation. The original stan-
dards of constitutional review were established by the Constitutional Court in the
1990s. The most important interpretive tool was the so-called ‘necessity-
proportionality test’, by which the Court constantly reviewed the constitutionality
of rights-limitations based more or less on the pattern of the jurisdiction of the
German Bundesverfassungsgericht. This manner was codiﬁed by the Fundamental
Law in Art. 1.5 Another major general rule on constitutional interpretation can
be found in Art. R para (3) of the Fundamental Law: ‘[t]he provisions of the
Fundamental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their purposes, with the
Avowal of National Faith contained therein, and with the achievements of our
historical constitution’. The new Constitution set up further rules of interpretation,
partly related to economic considerations.6
The Fundamental Law signiﬁcantly modiﬁed the competencies of the Con-
stitutional Court. Thus, the actio popularis procedure was abolished, even though
it had been the most effective tool to launch a judicial review procedure in con-
stitutionally controversial cases for a long time. Instead, since 2012 only the head
of state, the Government, the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights and the one-
fourth of the members of Parliament have had the right to initiate the ex post facto
abstract review of legislative acts. In addition, the Court was deprived of its power
to review and annul budgetary laws and acts on taxes, duties, pensions, customs or
any kind of ﬁnancial contributions to the state, unless they violated the right to life
and human dignity; the right to the protection of personal data; freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; and the rights related to Hungarian citizenship.
In theory, this limitation has been only provisional, as it would cease when the
level of state debt goes below 50 per cent of the GDP. In reality, since then the
Constitutional Court has not reviewed the public ﬁnance laws. Nevertheless,
the Constitutional Court has been compensated to a degree for the loss of its
fundamental power; the new constitution, on the German pattern, introduced the
politically neutral institution of individual constitutional complaint. While the
abstract constitutional review of legal acts has reduced since 2012 and has been a
more or less irrelevant competence with regard to its measure, the individual
constitutional complaint procedure has become the most viable opportunity for
constitutional adjudication. However, the overall assessment of the case load
shows that the control function over normative, mostly legislative acts has decreased
signiﬁcantly.7
The composition of the Constitutional Court was completely changed as well.
Just a few months after its formation in 2010, the new coalition government using
its two-thirds majority transformed the process of nominating the judges of the
Constitutional Court. Since then, the membership of the parliamentary committee
responsible for the nomination has no longer been based on parity, but has instead
reﬂected the party-strength in the Parliament. Besides that, Art. 24 of the Funda-
mental Law introduced a new design with 15 judges instead of the former 11. The
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new constitution also empowered Parliament to elect the head of the Court
(before that, he or she was elected by the justices themselves).
2. The changing role and jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court in
the era of the ‘unorthodox economic policy’ of Government
2.1 Changing constitutional landscape of national economy and public ﬁnance
As it has already been said, Hungary has been deeply affected by some of the
challenges about which we talked in the Introduction. First, Hungary is a small,
open economic system, highly dependent on the trends of the world economy.
The country has been a Member State of the European Union since 2004 where it
belongs to the economic periphery with its GDP amounting to about 65 per cent
of the average gross national product of the EU countries. Although its rate of
economic growth was above the EU average between 1997 and 2006, the results
of the economic catching up policy have never been clear as the country has had
ﬁnancial accounting problems since her accession. Before the world economic
crisis, since 2004, the European Commission proceeded with an excessive deﬁcit
procedure against Hungary because of its longstanding unbalanced budget. The
crisis brought about serious economic depression almost immediately after its
outbreak in the autumn of 2008, and increased sharply the ﬁnancial risks of the
country. The economic performance turned into a recession, as the loss of GDP
was almost 7 per cent in 2009.
As a response to the rising ﬁnancial risks, the Orbán Government after 2010
discontinued the policy lines of the former government, and started a so-called
‘unorthodox’ economic policy instead of the traditional and well-admitted instru-
ments of economic recovery.8 This means the application of unexpected and
unusual policy measures such as extending the economic role of the state and
limiting market competition; centralising state economic resources; keeping ‘strategic
enterprises’ in Government hands and widening the range of the exclusive economic
activity of state (e.g. establishing new monopolies); restructuring the ownership
relations in a number of areas of the market economy (enhancing the inﬂuence of
the ‘national owners’); pursuing a protectionist economic policy (e.g. preferring
Hungarian companies in public procurements); imposing sectoral special taxes (in
banking, telecommunication, energy and retail sectors); rearranging foreign trade
relations (‘opening to the East’); or launching intensive public work projects
(pursuing full employment).
Many pieces of this policy have had constitutional implications. Thus, the con-
stitutional landscape of the economy was changed by the Fundamental Law of
2011. Most importantly, the change of jurisprudence was encouraged by the
principles of constitutional interpretation laid down by the Fundamental Law
requiring the Constitutional Court to respect extra-legal interests and objectives.
Hence, the new Constitution not only prescribes that the constitutional provisions
must be interpreted ‘in accordance with their purposes’, the preamble and
the ‘achievements’ of the historical constitution,9 but also requires – among
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others – the Constitutional Court to respect the principles of the ‘balanced,
transparent and sustainable budget management’ in the course of performing
its tasks.10
The new constitution has also clariﬁed the constitutional nature of the social
and economic rights as state aims, instead of recognising them as basic rights.
Although this might seem to be a decrease of protection, it brings the regulation
closer to practice; the old constitution, for example, declared simply the right to
work (as a remnant of its original text, dated in 1949), without any enforceable
right. The Fundamental Law emphasises the importance of national assets and the
empowerment of the legislature to determine the range of exclusive economic
activities of the state. It refers also to the principles of social responsibility of the
property right and the right to enterprise.
Moreover, as already mentioned, by restricting the review power of the Con-
stitutional Court, the new basic law has pulled the public ﬁnance legislation out of
constitutional control. Since then, there have not been any constitutional hurdles
to the Government’s economic, ﬁnance and tax policy. Another meaningful
innovation was to create and place debt-brake rules in the Constitution. These
provisions have restricted the budgetary power of Parliament, which may not
adopt such a state budget ‘as a result of which state debt would exceed half of the
Gross Domestic Product’, and, as long as the national debt exceeds half of the
GDP, Parliament may only adopt a central budget that provides the reduction of
the state debt.11
2.2 Changing constitutional jurisprudence in economic and ﬁnancial matters
Despite (or precisely because of) the meaningful limitation of the Constitutional
Court’s review power in economic and ﬁnancial issues, the jurisprudence of the
Court has signiﬁcantly changed in the past few years. However, at the very
beginning after the general election of 2010, when the old judges were still in
majority within the Court, the body tried to continue its earlier case-law. When
the Orbán Government came to power in 2010, one of its ﬁrst measures was to
get a new legislation through the Parliament that imposed retroactively a 98 per
cent tax on the so-called extreme severance payments paid in the public sector
from the beginning of that year. The major argument was that these payments,
even if they had been lawfully paid, had violated the ‘good morals’ (contra bonos
mores) and therefore must be withdrawn. Because the retroactive taxation was
expected to be found unconstitutional as it violates the principle of the rule of
law,12 the Government majority modiﬁed the old Constitution (of 1949/1989)
allowing ex post facto tax-imposing legislation in the case of incomes acquired
against good morals.13 The Constitutional Court found that while the modiﬁed
constitution allowed the retroactive tax-imposing legislation, the new law incor-
rectly deﬁned severance payment as being against good morals, once it had been
paid according to law.14 As an immediate reaction to this ruling, the Government
majority curtailed the review power of the Court in a way discussed above and
adopted a modiﬁed version of the law on the 98 per cent tax on severance
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payments This law was also sent to the Constitutional Court, and the Court,
within its recently restricted jurisdiction, and under the political pressure upon it,
found a compromise; while it declared unconstitutional that the law sanctioned
the severance payment paid since 2005, it upheld retroactive taxation if it extended
only to the beginning of the current tax year.15,16
One of the most important changes in constitutional jurisprudence was the
reduction of the level of the protection of property rights. In 2012, for example,
the Government decided to acquire a private savings bank that had a nationwide
network of afﬁliations and had many small shareholders. For this purpose, it ﬁrst
obtained a share in this bank. However, when the other shareholders refused to
allow the Government to gain full control over the bank, the Government
majority passed a special legislation that effectively handed control of this bank to
the national government. This law changed the ownership ratios and limited
shareholders’ rights (e.g. certain measures, such as issuing of bonds, reduction or
increase of its capital are subject to the previous approval of the Savings Bank).
The Hungarian Post was entitled to subscribe for the common shares at par value,
which is considerably less than the reasonable value based on the Savings Bank’s
equity situation, and which made it impossible for the previous shareholders to
pass resolutions. The constitutional complaints submitted by many shareholders
were denied by the Constitutional Court.17 The Court argued that the contested
measures had been taken for the beneﬁt of the earlier owners, as they strength-
ened the market position of the network of savings banks. Compared with the
standards of protection of property rights developed in the 1990s, this was a serious
change in jurisprudence. The property rights of the shareholders of the Savings
Bank were taken away, which led to the quasi-nationalisation of the Savings Bank.
Act CXXXV (135) 2013 on the integration of savings cooperatives created an
integration which took away the legal, ﬁnancial and operational independence of
its members. The Hungarian Development Bank, with a call option to the shares
of the Savings Bank, was put in an extremely strong position, by which it could
pass whatever resolution it wished, thus giving the State a strong controlling
position.
The economic crisis of 2008 and especially the rapid exchange rate depreciation
of the Hungarian forint resulted in a signiﬁcantly worsened situation of debtors.18
Legislative acts aiming to help the situation and related judicial decisions were
reviewed by the Constitutional Court continuously. Novel constitutional ideas,
unconventional constitutional measures and new doctrinal solutions were born in
foreign currency loan-related decisions. In its decision 34/2014. (XI. 14.) the
Constitutional Court examined the constitutionality of the legislative act regulating
basically two questions: namely, the nullity of exchange rate margins in foreign
currency loan contracts and the presumed unfairness of provisions enabling banks
to unilateral amendment of interests, fees and costs in foreign-currency consumer
loan contracts.19 According to the Constitutional Court the rules did not attain
the level of unconstitutionality either in the details or as a whole. The Court
acknowledged that the Act did have a restrictive effect on the fundamental rights
in question such as on the freedom to contract, the right to property, the right to
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fair trial and, furthermore, the Act might raise concerns with regard to its ex tunc,
retroactive effect, which is against the rule of law, but the Act was not considered
unconstitutional as the legislative solution was proportionate with the aim to protect
the citizens in desperate ﬁnancial situations. Giving priority to substantive justice
before procedural justice is a new phenomenon in the Hungarian constitutional
jurisprudence. The Court in this case argued with the responsibility of the state to
provide help for people in desperate situations, and the legitimate aim to help
people and do justice for them overruled former principles developed by the
Constitutional Court related to the constitutional relevance of procedural fairness,
legal stability, predictability and the ban on retroactive legislation (rule of law).
This is why it could happen that although the Constitutional Court acknowledged
many arguments that have been raised, it still rejected the claims. The Court noted
that although this time it accepts the constitutionality of these problematic provi-
sions, the legislative power should use these kinds of instruments in extraordinary
cases and only in a narrow sense.20 In the case of the review of the very same 2014
legislation, the second instance judges who dealt with these cases also turned to
the Constitutional Court in judicial referrals, claiming that the law is unconstitu-
tional due to breach of the principle of separation of powers, right to fair trial, rule
of law and the legal certainty. In decision 2/2015. (II. 2.)21 the Constitutional
Court rejected all judicial referrals in this round as well. The Constitutional Court
emphasised that the reasons explained in the earlier decision justify the restrictions
referred to by the judges; therefore, on the basis of proportionality, these rules as
well were found to be constitutional.
Yet, the protection of private persons, and the ex post risk sharing proved to
trump these values. The changing approach of the Court is well characterised by
another decision in which it declared that
in the emergency situation of public ﬁnance deepened by the economic
situation as well as the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, it was inevitable to set as
a long-term governmental goal, the reduction of public debt. A number of fair
and legitimate demands and efforts had to be subject to this goal.22
Later, the Constitutional Court concluded a great number of decisions based on
the same foreign currency loan crisis legislation. These judicial decisions applied
this law. All claims were rejected,23 although the CC itself acknowledged that the
extraordinary emergency solutions were problematic from the rule of law point of
view. The legislation imposed unreasonable burden on ﬁnancial institutions with
retroactive effect and furthermore did not allow for a fair trial.24 Without going
into the very rich details of the assessment of the case25 we must summarise that
before 2008, it was unimaginable that such an interpretation would be accepted
by the majority of the Constitutional Court with regard to the classic rule of law
values. Although it is not unprecedented that the Constitutional Court refers to
unfavourable changes of the economic situation in its argumentation, this was very
rare in the case law of the Constitutional Court. Reference to the emergency crises
was also very different from the one in decision 34/2014 (IX. 14.) or 2/2015 (II. 2.).
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At the very beginning of the 1990s, in its decision no. 26/1992. (IV. 30.) the
Constitutional Court stated that
[a]s a special, one-time circumstance of the change of the regime, in this social
phenomenon, the trade union assets accumulated were put in a ‘crisis
situation’ due to cessations and transformations without being settled legally.
In this crisis situation the legislator shall secure the protection, the use, the
usability and availability of trade union assets guaranteeing the constitutional
freedom of the interest group until the terms of ﬁnancial situation are not
settled. The constitutionality of exceptional and one-off interventions is linked
to the utmost importance of trade unions and the accomplished transition of
trade unions. This, however, does not mean that the transition of other social
organisations and settling the ﬁnancial situation shall be conducted by
subsequent legislation.
To contrast with this decision, in the Constitutional Court decision 23/2013. (IX. 25.)
the Court declared that the abolishment of the possibility of the early retirement
for certain state employees, such as for the policemen or for the members of the
army,26 is constitutional although the change was introduced with retroactive
effect. The decision pointed out, that
in the emergency situation of public ﬁnance deepened by the economic
situation as well as the ﬁnancial and economic crisis, it was inevitable to set as
a long-term governmental goal, the reduction of public debt. A number of fair
and legitimate demands and efforts had to be subject to this goal.27
This statement seems to be quite general and means that at any time when special
and hard circumstances occur, it is legitimate to deviate from the original rules.
We argue, however, that according to the former jurisprudence of the Court, in
case the state of emergency with its special rules has not been declared by the
constitutionally dedicated bodies, no speciﬁc standards can be applied. The rule of
law cannot be protected against the rule of law according to the famous wording
of the Court.28 Although there are very few decisions when the Constitutional
Court had altered from regular standards in its former jurisprudence as well, the
alterations were indicated as unique ones. What we ﬁnd, however, in the new
ﬁnancial crisis related jurisprudence, is that special solutions become ordinary
rules, because the Constitutional Court claims that whenever these difﬁculties or
challenges occur (which is quite regular in the twenty-ﬁrst century even if there is
a normally operating state), the Constitutional Court can justify the alteration
from settled constitutional standards. Although the constitutional framework is
partly invented for the sake of providing stability for law and jurisprudence,
according to the recent ﬁnancial crisis related case law, there is diminished rule of
law protection when the state is in trouble.
In another decision, the Constitutional Court upheld the extremely con-
troversial law29 that had completely restructured the tobacco retail trade market,
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withdrawing the state concessions from previous tobacconists, and redistributing
the government approvals through a highly debated application system. The
Court argued that the earlier licences had not established a vested right for the
tobacco sellers to continue their activity without limitation. Furthermore, it
spectacularly turned away from its earlier practice when it declared that the
tobacco seller’s licence does not fall within the scope of the property rights.
Since the early 1990s, the permanent practice of the Constitutional Court was to
extend the protection of property rights to private ﬁnancial savings, concessions,
licenses and similar rights (representing pecuniary interests) on the basis that
these rights have the same function as the property (i.e. ‘the provision of the
material basis of personal autonomy’).30 Notably, in contrast with this decision,
the European Court of Human Rights held that the withdrawal of the prior
licences by law without compensation was such a breach of property rights that
was a violation of Art. 1 of the Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention of
Human Rights.31
Nonetheless, it must be taken into consideration that because of the reduction
of review powers of the Constitutional Court, the most important public ﬁnance
cases have not been brought before the Court, or if there was a proper petition,
referring to this limitation, the body did not undertake to decide the case. Probably,
the activist Court of the early 1990s, on the basis of its rich jurisprudence on the
right to human dignity, would dare to adjudicate such cases, especially when such
important constitutional issues were at stake, for example, the constitutionality of
the extraordinary sectoral taxes, the nationalisation of private pension savings
without compensation, or withdrawal of vested rights.
3. Migration
Hungary was deeply affected by the migration inﬂux to Europe in 2015. In that
year, more than 400,000 migrants arrived in the country,32 and most of them
moved on to Austria and Germany. The country was not able to provide effective
border guards to register all migrants and to control their movement. Under such
circumstances, the Hungarian Government took a harsh anti-immigration stance
from the very beginning of the migrant crisis, and heavily criticised the EU insti-
tutions for the way in which they managed the European migration crisis. It
initiated a national referendum against the controversial quota system proposed by
the EU for the resettlement of migrants among the Member States.33 According
to this plan, the member countries should share the burden of the migrant crisis
relocating the asylum seekers from the front-line states (Greece and Italy) among
all Member States. Under this plan, Hungary should admit 1,294 people from the
total of 160,000. The government refused to accept any refugees under this pro-
gramme, and ﬁled a case at the European Court of Justice arguing that the EU
institutions did not have the power to compel the Member States to allow
migrants to settle therein. In addition, at the end of 2015, the Hungarian Govern-
ment decided to build a border barrier (fence) on its border with Serbia and
Croatia in order to prevent immigrants from entering the country illegally.
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The Constitutional Court was involved in the ﬁght against ‘illegal migration’.
First, it refused the petitions asking the Court to invalidate the resolution of
Parliament to call the so-called ‘quota-referendum’.34 This popular vote was
initiated by the Government in 2016 with the apparent purpose to refuse the
refugee relocation policy of the European Union. Although the referendum was
obviously unconstitutional for several reasons,35 the Court interpreted its own
scope of authority in a narrow way, arguing that it has the competence to
examine only the procedural fairness of the relevant parliamentary resolution.36
Albeit the law on the Constitutional Court really restricts the scope of constitu-
tional review in such cases, it is to be noted that the jurisprudence of the Court
in the 1990s and – occasionally also in the 2000s – was frequently characterised
as ‘activist’ relating to its jurisdiction37 and self-identity. Also for procedural
reasons, without any substantive examination, the Court rejected the constitu-
tional complaints challenging the supreme court’s (Kúria) decision having
approved the question of the referendum as legal.38 According to the Court, the
petitioners had no standing positions as they had not been addressed personally
by this judicial decision.
Another decision of the Court was more important, because in this case its
competence was not restricted at all. In December 2015 the Commissioner for
Fundamental Rights submitted a petition to the Court requesting an abstract
constitutional interpretation of two provisions of the Fundamental Law. One
provision prohibits the ‘collective expulsion’ from the territory of Hungary of any
Hungarian or foreign citizens. In this regard, the petition put the question whether
this prohibition is valid also if another state expels people collectively. Apparently,
the background consideration of this question was to encourage the Constitutional
Court to declare that relocating 1,294 refugees to Hungary under the auspices of
the EU relocation programme is unconstitutional according to Hungarian Funda-
mental Law (and as such, Hungary can not be obliged to accept and accom-
modate them). The petitioner explicitly argued that the transfer of these people to
Hungary in a procedure ‘implemented without the comprehensive examination on
the merits of the individual situations of the applicants’ is apparently a collective
expulsion. The other relevant provision of the Fundamental Law was its Art. E
para (2) which provides the constitutional mandate for Hungary’s EU member-
ship. This clause determines conditions for transferring competences to the EU
institutions and for the joint exercise of powers deriving the Hungarian Constitu-
tion.39 The interpretive questions of the Commissioner’s petition was whether the
Hungarian authorities are obliged to execute such measures of the EU law that are
in contrast with the provisions of the Hungarian Fundamental Law, and if not,
which Hungarian institution may declare that. It is worth noting that the Com-
missioner’s questions are clearly based on the political position of the Hungarian
Government that the EU Council exceeded its scope of competence when it
decided on the relocation program, as this legal act of the EU was not based on a
competence transferred by Hungary to the European Union. The Commissioner
suggested that the Hungarian institutions are not constitutionally obliged to obey
the ultra vires EU regulations and it is unconstitutional when the European
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Union exercises a competence by going beyond the ‘necessary extent’ of the
competences vested in the Union.
The Constitutional Court, referring to the ‘National Avowal’ (preamble) of the
Fundamental Law and its ‘EU-clause’, stated that the joint exercising of any
competence by the national authorities and the EU institutions may not violate
Hungary’s sovereignty, and, on the other hand, it cannot lead to the violation of
‘constitutional identity’.40 Both limitations reﬂected the Government’s position
attacking the cited EUC Decision 2015/1601. The Court stressed that with the
EU accession, Hungary ‘has not surrendered its sovereignty’, and the national
sovereignty ‘should be presumed when judging upon the joint exercising of fur-
ther competences additional to the rights and obligations provided in the
Founding Treaties of the European Union’. In addition to this, the Court
declared also that it reserves the power to interpret ‘the concept of constitutional
identity as Hungary’s self-identity and it unfolds the content of this concept
from case to case’.
Although the Constitutional Court underlined that it does not ‘comment on
the validity, invalidity or the primacy of application’ of the EU legal acts, the
whole ruling refutes this statement, as the Court declared itself the ‘principal
organ’ of the protection and safeguarding of the sovereignty of Hungary and its
constitutional identity.
The decision is in sharp contrast with the earlier jurisprudence of the Court
which had never before claimed the power to review whether the EU legal acts are
in harmony with the national sovereignty and the constitutional identity of Hungary.
Instead, the Court always respected the division of review power between the
European Court of Justice and itself and the primacy and direct applicability of the
EU law.41 According to the ruling approach and the unbroken practice of con-
stitutional interpretation – based on a more or less identical constitutional text –
the Constitutional Court does not have competence to review the legality of the
EU legal norms.42
Before this, the Constitutional Court never developed arguments authorising
itself to review the potentially ultra vires EU legislation or EU law infringing certain
fundamental constitutional provisions.43 The only reference to the constitutional
boundaries of EU law is found in the Lisbon Decision. In this ruling,44 the Con-
stitutional Court offered the most comprehensive interpretation of the extent of
the transfer of sovereignty and the role of the Constitutional Court in reviewing
the constitutionality of the division of competence between Hungary and the
EU. The petitioner requested the a posteriori examination of the unconstitution-
ality and also the annulment of the Act of Parliament implementing the Treaty of
Lisbon. In the petitioner’s opinion, certain rules of the Treaty of Lisbon restricted
Hungary’s sovereignty to an extent that, if their binding nature was recognised,
the Republic of Hungary ‘would no longer qualify as an independent state gov-
erned under the rule of law’. In this case, the Constitutional Court conducted a
substantive constitutionality review, whose ﬁnal conclusion was that the law pro-
mulgating the Treaty of Lisbon was not unconstitutional because the constitutions
of Member States could still exercise control over the operation of the EU. The
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principles of subsidiarity and proportionality would remain valid, and they ensure
that the national parliaments would still have the power to review draft legislation.
Also, Member States would have the right to initiate an action for annulment,
citizens could turn to the institutions of the EU through a Citizens’ Initiative, and
the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which safeguards basic rights, now has the
same value as the treaties.45
Summing up, it is clear that the Constitutional Court has substantially changed
its position towards the relationship between the domestic and the EU law and its
own concerning competence. As a judge in his concurring opinion explicitly sup-
posed, ‘the Constitutional Court should reconsider its judicial practice related to
establishing the place of EU law in the legal system of Hungary’.46
Although in one respect the recent interpretive practice of the Court has
approached the constitutional text (the Constitutional Court today seems to con-
sider the EU Founding Treaties as international treaties, while in the past it
emphasised that the EU law is a sui generis legal system), the reference to the
constitutional identity is also an unprecedented (and unelaborate) innovation,
while its identiﬁcation with the national sovereignty which can be contrasted with
the primacy of the EU law seems to be unfounded reasoning. What is noticeable,
however, is its concurrence with the political argumentation of the governing
coalition which insistently emphasises the importance of the protection of
national sovereignty from the illegitimate inﬂuence of ‘Brussels’ as a symbol of
the European Union.
4. Terrorism and inland security
Compared with France, Britain or Germany, Hungary has not been directly
affected by terrorism. Indeed, since 2010 only two cases have occurred. The roots
of the ﬁrst case go back to the 2000s, when, according to the charges, the secretly
operating extreme-right group ‘Arrows of the Hungarians ‒ National Liberating
Army’ committed a number of violent actions against Hungarian politicians and
other public ﬁgures, and against Roma and Jewish people and communities. The
trial has been running since 2011, and it does not have links to international
terrorism. The second relevant case is the trial of ‘Ahmed H.’ for terrorism, which
was launched at the height of the ‘migrant crisis’ in Hungary and generated wide-
ranging international attention and condemnation. According to the ofﬁcial
charges, this migrant of Syrian origin incited the crowd waiting for admission at
the Hungarian–Serbian border to violence, and then joined the turbulent events
and disturbances that took place in September 2015.
Although neither of these two cases have been closed so far, the latter case
served as a justiﬁcation for the Government to submit a new constitutional
amendment (its sixth since its entry on 1 January 2012) on the ‘crisis situation
caused by a terrorist threat’, which was adopted by Parliament. The con-
stitutionalisation of ‘terrorist danger’ has eliminated the constitutional control
over the Government’s special empowerment in emergency situation announced
by the Parliament on account of a terrorist attack or any risk of terrorism.
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Yet, the Constitutional Court has preserved its power to judge the con-
stitutionality of any legal acts without this sort of crisis situation. In the exercise of
this power, the new practice of the Court can be characterised by a much more
deferential behaviour, or, in other words, a much less strict jurisprudence compared
with previous times.
Notwithstanding that the terrorist threat has been given great emphasis in
Government communication since the migrant ﬂow of 2015, only a few legal acts
have been adopted over last years related to domestic security, and even less have
reached the Constitutional Court.
One of these was a legislative act amending the law on national security services
in 2011. This law authorised the Minister of Justice to approve the application of
secret information gathering (i.e. interception or surveillance) to the Counter
Terrorism Centre. The Court, refusing the concerning constitutional complaints,
upheld the new legislation.47 Reasoning its decision, the Constitutional Court
started off from the view that the way of preventing national security risks needs a
political decision that justiﬁes the empowerment of the Minister of Justice to
permit secret information gathering. The Court considered it a sufﬁcient guaran-
tee that the Parliament’s National Security Committee would exercise oversight
over the Minister’s authorization procedure. In this way, the Court upheld a
general legal authorisation of the counter-terrorism agency without judicial over-
sight. It was a complete break with the previous case-law in which the Court
always insisted on the safeguard of judicial review in such cases, having regard to
the extent of the restriction of the right to privacy.48
Since the use of secret tools and methods is a serious intervention in the life of
the individuals, they can only be used as an exception, temporary, ultimate
solution.49
However, the Court on this occasion read from the former decisions only the
recognition that the use of secret surveillance, under certain circumstances, can be
a necessary and proportionate limitation of basic rights. Surprisingly, the Con-
stitutional Court also cited the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, even if the practice of
the Strasbourg Court considers the use of such tools legitimate only if it is under a
constant and compulsory control exercised by bodies which are independent of
the executive power.50 Interestingly, the legal case ended up in Strasbourg, where
the ECtHR found that Art. 8. of the Convention rights were violated by the
Hungarian legislation and the Hungarian Constitutional Court therefore did not
provide sufﬁcient remedy in the case.51
In light of this rupture with the earlier case-law, which has signiﬁcantly reduced
the level of protection of the right to privacy, it was quite surprising that the
Court invalidated another new legislation extending the use of secret surveillance
of public ofﬁcials (making it permanent instead of one-time national security
screening).52
In the context of domestic security issues, it is worth referring to the increasing
limitation on political communication rights that has also been found
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constitutional by the Constitutional Court. Freedom of assembly, as other political
rights, may legitimately be limited for security reasons, but more restrictions of
this nature have been imposed in recent times. According to the very liberal stat-
utory regulation, adopted still in the times of the ‘system change’ in 1989, a street
demonstration may be prohibited by public authorities only in two cases: if the
police ﬁnds that it would seriously endanger the proper functioning of the repre-
sentative institutions or courts, or if the circulation of the trafﬁc cannot be secured
by another route. Any other problem that might emerge during the event (such as
the violation of rights of others or the risk of a crime) can result only in the dis-
persing of the event. In a recent decision, however, the Constitutional Court held
that the police acted lawfully and constitutionally when they used a new, non-
codiﬁed reason to the prior interdiction of a demonstration in front of the home
of the prime minister (the reason was the assumed violation of the privacy of the
inhabitants in the neighbouring district).53 The Court also argued that there was
an unconstitutional omission in the sense that the Parliament should amend the
act on the freedom of assembly in order to regulate the cases when the freedom of
assembly and the right to privacy are in collision. The new legislation has not been
adopted yet, but it is quite likely that a stricter regulation will be agreed than the
present one as a consequence of the decision of the Constitutional Court.
5. Explaining the changing constitutional jurisprudence
The Hungarian Constitutional Court was for two decades the most effective
counterbalance of the Executive.54 It was often considered as one of the strongest
among similar courts, and an exemplar of the ‘activist’ judicial bodies. One could
rationally presume that it had to play an important role in maintaining
constitutionalism in turbulent times, when, as have seen, the country had to face
serious challenges. In point of fact, the recent history of Hungarian con-
stitutionalism suggests that certain crises, especially the economic depression and
mass migration, have brought about considerable constitutional changes. In 2011,
a new constitution was adopted, and a series of laws has renewed the whole legal
system.55 As we saw, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court has signiﬁcantly
changed, which is far from being attributed to the changed constitutional text.
However, a deeper analysis of the recent past of the constitutional review shows
that there is hardly any connection between the transformation of the Constitu-
tional Court’s case-law and the real need to give responses to the present-day
challenges. Put simply, even if some of the modern global crises have profoundly
affected the country, these pressures were not the real reasons as to why the Court
has altered its jurisprudence.
Although the negative effects and the risks of the world economic crisis, mass
migration or the terrorist threat have been frequently referred to in political com-
munication in the last few years, these circumstances did not play an important
role in law-making processes, except in cases of the new constitutional and legal
provisions relating to the relevant special legal orders. Thus, the Orbán Govern-
ment declared already in the early 2010s that Hungary had recovered from the
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economic depression, and when the excessive deﬁcit procedure against the country
was abolished in 2013, it was presented by the Government as a clear evidence
that Hungary was beyond the crisis. Since then the so-called ‘unorthodox eco-
nomic policy’ has not been communicated as a speciﬁc crisis management tool but
instead as a special Hungarian way for stabilisation and economic growth. Simi-
larly, though government propaganda has continuously laid stress upon the threat
of mass migration and international terrorism, since the border fence was built, the
migration pressure has practically ceased, and, as we saw, there has not been any
violent act that could be linked to international terrorism. Even the restrictive laws
were not justiﬁed by the crisis, or if this reason had been used, such kinds of
references to it were later dropped.56 In fact, crisis management was conducted
mainly by political tools (like the national referendum on the EU ‘migrant-quota’)
rather than by intensive or targeted law-making.
Paradoxically, the Constitutional Court, albeit only in words, tried to use the
crisis-argument. Thus, it was a memorable and astonishing manifestation when a
member of the Court, Barnabás Lenkovics, shortly before the parliamentary
majority elected him to be the President of the Constitutional Court, said in an
interview:
Constitutional adjudication is not independent of time and space. It must
keep the pace with the changing conditions. The same standards that were
developed and used for law-making by the Constitutional Court under stable
[…] circumstances, cannot be invariably applied to different historical condi-
tions. Otherwise, some measures could become dogmas, which would paral-
yze the operation of the legislature, the government, or even the system of
rule of law, and it would make it impossible to handle the [economic] crisis.57
These words probably expressed the attitude of the new judges who had been
selected and elected one-sidedly by the Government parties; namely, that extra-
ordinary conditions provoked extraordinary solutions, including the reduction in
the level of rights-protection or the weakening of constitutional review compared
within previous periods. This was a really new approach, as a reverse logic would
have followed from the previous practice of the Constitutional Court: In times of
crises there is a growing need for constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights
and for the strengthening of the rule of law.
In practice, however, the Constitutional Court referred only rarely to the con-
straints arising from the crisis situations in reasoning its own decisions. When the
Court so resolutely upheld the legislative acts of the Government majority, and
endorsed the unprecedented extension of the executive power, usually it did not
allude to any predicament or emergency situation as a legitimacy basis for its
approval.
When this was not the case, the Court’s references to the economic crisis ‘as a
context’ served only for a general and loose justiﬁcation for revising the previously
formulated standards without any further legal reasoning, or as a legal ornament
concealing the lack of real arguments.
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Thus, the Constitutional Court decision 8/2014 (III. 20.) highlighted – in the
case of early repayment scheme in mortgage loan cases – that
a signiﬁcant, exceptional and serious situation occurred in Hungary in the
middle of an international crises which led to an intervention by law.58
The reference made to the economic crisis appears in Constitutional Court deci-
sions of 34/2014 (XI 14.) and 2/2015 (II. 2.) as well. The reasoning of the
previous one suggested that
it is commonly known that following the economic crisis of 2008–2009,
hundreds of thousands of loan contracts persistently appeared and caused
enormous difﬁculties. A mass of households had to face difﬁcult situations;
tens of thousands of families were threatened with eviction. Negative effects of
the problem are borne by the society, the whole of the national economy.
These problems could have not been resolved by judicial way (as part of
individual judicial protection).59
A further argument supporting our claim that the changes of constitutional adju-
dications which have taken place since 2010 cannot be explained by a legal crisis
management scenario, is that the jurisprudence of the Court has been deeply
transformed in some other areas of law that had not been affected either by the
economic crisis or the migration or other global challenges at all. The level of
rights-protection was drastically reduced by the Constitutional Court in the case of
some other civil liberties, as the Court was not able to prevent the guarantees
of the rule of law being weakened, or in some cases undermined. In short, the
changes of the Court’s case-law were far from being conﬁned to the legal areas
affected by crisis or major challenges.
But if it is true that the considerable changes in constitutional jurisprudence
cannot be attributed to an adaptation process, in which the major constitutional
doctrines and the interpretive practices are adjusted to the changing needs of the
changing times, the question remains: For what reasons have the mainstream and
outcomes of the Constitutional Court’s case-law changed to such a great extent?
We think that the unquestionable changes can only be understood by taking
into account their wider context and the developments that formed them. The
Hungarian constitutional changes that have taken place since 2010,60 when the
general elections brought about an overwhelming victory for the former opposition
parties, and a new conservative Government coalition, based on a two-thirds (i.e.
constitution-making) parliamentary majority, started to change the constitutional
landscape of the country. Exploiting this overwhelming majority, the Government
parties got their own political will through the Parliament, and voted for the new
constitution without the consent or even the cooperation of the opposition parties.
The adoption of the Fundamental Law of 2011 was followed by a period of
intensive law-making activity, which signiﬁcantly transformed almost all branches
of law and legal areas. Both the constitution-making process and the following
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legislative activity led not only to ﬁerce debates in the country but also caused a
stir on an international level as well. The reason for this attention and the heavy
criticism was that the measures of the two consecutive terms of Orbán Govern-
ment after 2010 systematically dismantled the principles of the separation of
powers and the rule of law.61 These developments and events aroused a lot of
criticism in international forums, and induced the EU institutions to establish a
mechanism of controlling the state of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental
rights in the Member States.
The prime minister Viktor Orbán, in a speech in July 2014 openly expressed his
views about the policy objectives of the Government. While praising Singapore,
China, India, Turkey, Russia as ‘making [their] nations successful’, and as the new
‘stars of international analyses’, he stated that ‘the new state that we are building is
an illiberal state, a non-liberal state’.62
The new constitution and the following legislative acts have fundamentally
affected also the constitutional adjudication, not only for the newly introduced,
constitutionally binding interpretive principles, but also because they have reduced
the level of rights-protection: For example, social rights became ‘state goals’
instead of their former position as fundamental rights deserving elevated protec-
tion, or the Fundamental Law enables the legislature to make differences between
religious communities, regulates hate speech against the previous constitutional
doctrine and restricts political advertisements.
Since the Constitutional Court had been from its very beginnings a powerful
counterbalance to executive power, it is not surprising that the body was involved
in constitutional changes. As we have discussed above, just a few months after its
formation, the new coalition government, using its two-thirds majority trans-
formed the process of nominating the justices of the Constitutional Court. Since
then, the membership of the parliamentary committee responsible for the nomi-
nation has no longer been based on parity, but reﬂects the party-strength in the
Parliament. Whereas the earlier regulation required a compromise between the
parties to nominate justices, under the new conditions, the government parties
were able to pack the Court, and the newly elected members of the Court were all
elected by the new two-thirds majority of the Parliament given by the governing
Fidesz–Christian-Democratic party coalition [later in 2016 the agreement of the
green party (LMP) became necessary to elect the four new judges]. By 2016 all
judges of the Constitutional Court were elected for 12 years instead of the former
9-year term and all of them are consented to if not appointed by the ruling
majority.
The Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law in March 2013, with the
apparent purpose to force the body to change its interpretive practice, repealed all
rulings of the Constitutional Court made prior to the entry into force of the
Fundamental Law (1st January 2012).63 By inscribing the controversial provisions
into the text of the Fundamental Law, the same amendment created a hostile
environment by openly overruling many former Constitutional Court decisions
that had declared important legislative acts of the government majority in Parliament
to be unconstitutional.
Judicial deference or political loyalty? 105
T&F PROOFS NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
New Challenges to Constitutional Adjudication in Europe; edited by Zoltán
Szente and Fruzsina Gárdos-Orosz
Format: Royal (156 × 234mm); Style: A; Font: Galliard;
Dir: {Desktop}New folder/9781138057890_text.3d;
Created: 22/12/2017 @ 10:07:23
In effect, in the light of the successful court-packing, it is slightly surprising that
the government majority curtailed the review power of a friendly Court in a way as
we have seen already, as the repeal of the old decisions can be considered as a
precautionary measure with the hope of long-term effects. The underlying reason
could be that a strong and independent constitutional review cannot be compa-
tible with parliamentary supremacy64 in a country where the government parties
enjoy a huge popular support, and a constitution-making majority in Parliament.
The Constitutional Court, in its new composition, did not disappoint for those
who had designed and accomplished the changes in the institutional setting and
the membership of the Court. Both the available qualitative65 and quantitative66
research show that in controversial political issues the Court usually makes a
decision favourable for the Government, and that the new judges more or less
follow their own political orientations.
If we analyse the reasons for the changes in the constitutional environment and
especially of the practice of the Constitutional Court since 2010, we can conclude
that the world ﬁnancial crisis, the terrorist danger, the ﬂow of migrants or any
other new challenges do not provide plausible explanations for all these funda-
mental changes that have occurred not only in crisis-led cases but in other areas
too. Most changes of constitutional jurisprudence have been brought about by the
unquestionable authoritarian tendencies building up a so-called ‘illiberal democ-
racy’, declining all institutional counterbalances against the executive power.
Of course, even a ‘new authoritarianism’ might be considered as a special
response to the modern challenges of our world. However, if one considers this a
realistic option, it must be made clear that this kind of political discourse is outside
the dimension of constitutional democracies.
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